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Introduction 
 
This paper examines and explains the process and outcome of defence reform during the 
Labour Government (1997-2010). It argues that the experiences of military operations 
combined with observation of the successes and failures of concepts and capabilities 
associated with the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA)1  led, by the mid-2000s, to the 
identification of a model of military ‘best practice’ relevant to short to medium-term conflict 
scenarios. This model has taken the form of a joint, network-enabled military endowed with the 
‘balance’ allowing it to participate in operations across the full-spectrum of intensity. The paper 
finds that defence reform at the operational level has been dynamic and guided by the dictates 
of military ‘best practice’, rather than the path dependency, organisational culture or 
transnational norms of conventional warfare (Farrell, 2001; 2005). This finding contrasts 
markedly with the arguments of Cornish and Dorman (2009a: 261) who posit that British 
defence policy, planning and analysis ‘has reached a state of organisational, bureaucratic and 
intellectual decay’. 
Nevertheless, the paper highlights significant deficiencies at the strategic-level of 
defence planning. It finds that the capacity of the British military to translate the experiences of 
military operations in into changes to force postures and defence capability acquisition has 
been circumscribed by the presence of organisational politics between the Single-Services 
which, in competing for budget share, have fostered an ‘overheating’ of the UK equipment 
programme and stagnation in force planning. Yet the impact of organisational politics is not a 
stand-alone variable. It derives, instead, from the reduced capacity of the core executive to 
make far-reaching changes to the content and process of defence capability acquisition and to 
force structures. Causality lies in the electoral cycle that, during the final term of the Labour 
government (2005-10) has reduced the autonomy of the core executive in defence policy and 
has incentivised the short-term temporal management of convergence with the imperatives of 
the international security environment. Neoclassical Realism, that recognises the independent 
role of ‘international structure’ in driving military emulation, but that emphasises the intervening 
role of domestic variables in slowing down the transmission belt linking changes in the 
international security environment to policy response, emerges as the most convincing 
framework to conceptualise the process of British defence reform.  
The study makes an important contribution to the contemporary literature on British 
defence reform and to theoretical debates on the sources of military change. The articles of 
Cornish and Dorman (2009a; 2009b; 2010), Edmunds, (2010) and Farrell and Gordon (2009) 
provide vital empirical insights into the process of recent UK defence reforms. These studies 
fail, however, to properly extrapolate the theoretical implications of the process and outcome of 
British military transformation. Cornish and Dorman (2010: 409) correctly note that the 
‘prolonged hiatus in grand strategic policy and planning has been extremely unhelpful’ and 
decry the lack of a clear sense of political purpose underpinning UK defence policy, identifying 
deficiencies in declaratory policy, military strategy and the defence budget (2009a: 248). Yet 
they do not fully explain the root causes of the combination of dynamism and inertia at the 
operational and strategic levels of defence policy during the Labour Government. Furthermore, 
the theoretically-informed work on British defence policy (Farrell, 2008) adopts a cultural 
approach.  
This paper forms part of a broader wave of recent scholarship that attempts to reassert 
the analytical leverage of Realist theory in conceptualising defence and security policy in post-
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Cold War Europe (Dyson, 2008; 2010, Hyde-Price, 2007; Posen, 2006; Rynning, 2001/02) and 
raises some interesting implications for theories of defence transformation. The paper also 
makes an important empirical contribution by exploring the neglected area of the management 
of military input to British defence planning at the operational and strategic levels.  
The paper begins by mapping the UK’s selective emulation of the RMA.  After outlining 
Cultural and Neorealist approaches to defence reform, the paper tests these approaches 
against the process of British military transformation at operational level and examines the 
structuring of military input to defence planning. The paper then turns to the process of reform 
at the strategic level, highlighting the analytical leverage of Neoclassical Realism and proceeds 
by examining the organisational reforms which will be undertaken to provide ‘institutional 
protection’ for the process and implementation of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR). The paper concludes by outlining the implications of the study for future 
empirical and theoretical research. 
 
Defence Reform under Labour: A Selective Emulation of the RMA 
 
Until the post-2005 focus on the capabilities and doctrines suitable for irregular warfare, the 
RMA formed the central organising principle underpinning US defence reform. The RMA is 
succinctly defined by Krepinevic (2004: 30): ‘It is what occurs when the application of new 
technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational 
concepts and organisational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and 
conduct of conflict.’ The RMA has coalesced around three features. Firstly, expeditionary 
forces characterised by joint command structures. Secondly, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW): 
a shift from weapons platforms to knowledge-empowered networked forces capable of 
exercising agility and precision in applying attritional force (Dahl, 2002: 5). Effects-Based 
Operations (EBO) have dominated conceptual development on NCW and formed, until 2006, 
the third key feature of transformation. EBO focus on the conduct of rapid, decisive operations 
against near-peer competitors, involving close networked coordination and the mobilisation of 
all sources of national power (political, economic, military and diplomatic) (Ho, 2005: 172-74). 
British Defence Reform has involved an emulation of the concepts and capabilities associated 
with the RMA. This section will, however, highlight the selective nature of this emulation that is 
marked by several distinctive features. These include scepticism of the utility of technology, a 
preference for decentralised command and control and a focus on developing the capacity to 
participate in conflict that can vary quickly in intensity.  
It was not until the Labour Government’s election in 1997 that far-reaching change took 
place to the objectives and instruments of policy. The 1997/98 Strategic Defence Review 
(SDR) outlined a wide range of defence missions and created a new role: ‘defence diplomacy’2. 
In place of Territorial and Alliance Defence, the SDR set out a new expeditionary strategy of 
‘forward defence’: that it is ‘better to meet a crisis than to wait for it to come to you’ (Dorman, 
2006: 154). The Review also undertook structural reform, reorganising the military to permit two 
small-scale deployments or one full-scale deployment and in recognition of the increasing 
importance of ‘jointness’, created the Joint Rapid Reaction Force, structured around Navy, Air 
and Infantry assets (King, 2005: 325). In short, the SDR represented an important shift to 
strategic mobility and deployment outside of Europe in support of crisis-management. While 
these changes began under the Conservatives, as McInnes (1998: 836) notes: ‘Labour has 
pushed them further than before, and decisively so’.  
The 2002 ‘New Chapter’ formed an initial recognition of the urgency of adapting to the 
RMA and, following 9/11, signaled an important change in the focus of strategy from North 
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Africa/the Middle East to global power projection (Dorman, 2006: 154-5). The 2003 and 2004 
Defence White Papers (DWPs) outlined the implications of post-Cold War experiences more 
clearly in terms of capabilities and conceptual/doctrinal development. The 2004 DWP also 
altered force structures to ensure the capacity to concurrently conduct (as part of a coalition) 
three small and medium-scale operations or simultaneously conduct one large scale and one 
small-scale operation.3  
The Air Force adapted to the requirements of expeditionary operations by placing a 
stronger emphasis on developing the Typhoon’s ground attack capabilities and by acquiring the 
Joint Combat Aircraft (Farrell, 2008: 799). Furthermore, in June 2006 the Expeditionary Air 
Wings were established at the RAF’s main operating bases to improve the deployability of the 
air components of force packages. Beginning with the publication of the first edition of British 
Maritime Doctrine in 1996, the Navy underwent a doctrinal shift from sea control/anti-submarine 
warfare to maritime force projection. Capability procurement has augmented the Navy’s 
expeditionary capacity, including two aircraft carriers (Future Carriers, (CVF)) capable of 
deploying 40 aircraft (compared to the 22 aircraft of the existing carriers) ready for service in 
2016 and 2018; the deployment of six anti-air warfare Type-45 destroyers by 2009 and six 
Astute Class Submarines, the first of which entered into service in 2009 (Farrell, 2008: 799). 
The 2003/04 DWPs outlined a more focused reform of the Army, including developing 
increasingly deployable brigades: two heavy-armoured brigades, three Medium-Weight 
Brigades, one Light-Brigade, the Air-Assault and Royal Marine Commando Brigades (Farrell, 
2008: 800).4 These developments were complemented by the Joint Medium-Weight Capability 
Analytical Concept for Military Operations, designed to provide ‘strategic reach’, ‘operational 
and tactical agility’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘endurance’ (Farrell, 2008: 801). The 2008 Future Land 
Operational Concept (FLOC) outlines the goal of creating a ‘balanced’ Army that, by 2018, will 
be able to participate in conflict of rapidly varying intensity (Stabilisation and COIN operations) 
as well as classic Major Combat Operations (MCO).5  
 The 2002 ‘New Chapter’ and 2003 DWP involved an explicit, though selective, 
emulation of US military ‘transformation’. The 2003 DWP reinforced the SDR’s emphasis on 
jointness, signaled a shift from platform-centric planning to a Networked-Enabled Capability 
(NEC)6 and heralded an Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) (Benbow: 2009: 24). 
British NEC (that will reach a ‘mature’ state between 2020-30 characterised by synchronisation 
between joint military forces) forms a moderate emulation of NCW (Farrell, 2008: 787-8; 
Mandille, 2003: 50-1).7 NEC seeks to exploit the tactical and operational advantages delivered 
by technology, but is more circumspect about networking’s potential to transform the nature of 
warfare (Dorman, 2006: 156; Farrell, 2008: 786-7).  
Initiated in 2003, British EBO initially adopted a scientific approach to forecasting 
effects (Boyce, 2003: 30-7; Farrell, 2008: 790-3).8 However, in 2005 EBO was replaced by 
EBAO, reflecting the recognition that it was not military operations themselves which had 
changed in character, but the approach to operations (Farrell, 2008: 793). EBAO emphasises 
not only operational end-states envisaging ‘defeat of the enemy’, but also the creation of 
‘prosperity’, ‘security’, ‘reliable infrastructure’ and ‘governance’ (Farrell, 2008: 794). As the 2008 
British Defence Doctrine notes: ‘the UK needs to maintain the ability to respond swiftly and 
                                                
3 ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities’, 2004, pt.1.2. 
4  ‘Future Capabilities’, 2004, pts.2.11-2.18; Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper’, 2003, 
pt.4.12. 
5 ‘FLOC’, 2008, pt.111. 
6 ‘Defence White Paper’, 2003, pt.1.5. 
7 ‘Future Capabilities’, 2004, pts.2.1–2.3. See also ‘Network Enabled Capability’, JSP 777, edn. 1, MoD, p.10. 
8 Interviews, DCDC, Shrivenham, 18 November 2009. 
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decisively across the full range of intervention scenarios.’ 9  The concept of EBAO has, 
therefore, been located within a multi-agency approach to operations ensuring that civilian 
agencies take the lead when appropriate. This has come to be termed the ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’ 10  that seeks to integrate the diplomatic, military, economic and informational 
dimensions of operations (Benbow, 2009: 29; Dorman, 2007: 312; Farrell, 2008: 793). EBAO is 
conceived of as an approach that, embedded within the Comprehensive Approach, can 
facilitate the integration of all government agencies in delivering both kinetic and non-kinetic 
effects.11  
EBAO also integrates the negative experiences of the US with the hierarchical ‘long-
screwdriver approach’ to military command (Storr, 2003: 123). The British system of Mission 
Command remains dominant. (Dorman, 2006: 155; Storr, 2003: 119-21). Rooted in the concept 
of the ‘Corps d’Armee’ of the Napoleonic Wars and Prussian military thought, the practice of 
Mission Command was formally adopted by the British Army in 1987 in doctrinal reforms 
initiated by General Sir Nigel Bagnall, the former Chief of the General Staff (1985-87). Mission 
Command involves ensuring that the military commander is clear on an operation’s political 
goals and that these goals are effectively communicated to lower-levels of command, which are 
permitted a significant level of freedom to display initiative.12  Mission Command enables a 
balance between ‘direction and delegation’13 allowing agility in operations of rapidly-varying 
intensity (Farrell, 2008: 788; Milton, 2001: 41-4; Storr, 2003: 123). Mission Command forms a 
key pillar of the ‘Manoeuvrist Approach’14 to operations that is characterised by ‘momentum, 
tempo and agility, which in combination, aim to achieve shock and surprise’ thereby ‘shattering 
the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his material’ and delivering the 
capability to attain effects disproportionately higher than the level of force applied.15 NEC is 
viewed as a means to strengthen the Manoeuvrist Approach and enhance the military’s 
capacity to conduct MCO and ‘Stabilisation/COIN’ (Benbow: 2009: 29).16  
Defence reform has, therefore, focused not only on high-technology assets, but has 
also invested in ‘human factors’ to strike a balance between the ‘warrior ethos’ and the skills 
necessary for lower-intensity tasks and to equip field commanders with the ability to undertake 
decentralised decision-making within a complex operational environment (Kiszely, 2006: 19-
20).17 The need to further develop cultural skills is also recognised by the October 2008 FLOC 
that emphasises the importance of training delivering an ‘adaptive foundation’.18 The centrality 
of cultural awareness to land forces is most clearly evidenced by the January 2009 Joint 
Doctrine Note 1/09: ‘The Significance of Culture to the Military’. The document outlines a shift 
away from a rank/command-determined level of cultural capability training to a task-specific 
structure for determining levels of cultural-generic and cultural-specific education.19 These 
changes represent important developments in UK Defence Doctrine, where the ‘war-fighting 
ethos’ has traditionally taken centre-stage (Milton, 2001: 41-44).  
                                                
9 ‘British Defence Doctrine’, 2008, pt. 201. See also: ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’, 2003, pt.4.9 and 
‘Campaigning’, JDP 01, Second Edition, MoD, 2008, pt.120;pt.125. 
10 On the Comprehensive Approach see: ‘Campaigning’, 2008, pts.237-8 and The Comprehensive Approach’, 
Joint Discussion Note, 4/05, 2006, pt.112. 
11 See ‘Incorporating and Extending the UK Military Effects-Based Approach Joint Doctrine’, 7/06, Development 
Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, September 2006. 
12 On Mission Command see ‘British Defence Doctrine’, 2008, pt. 508. 
13 ‘British Defence Doctrine, 2008, pt.511. 
14 It is, however, important to note the arguments of Owen (2008: 67), who posits that manoeuvre and attrition 
should be viewed as complementary. 
15 ‘British Defence Doctrine’, 2008, pt.521. 
16 ‘British Defence Doctrine’, 2008, pts.205-25 and ‘Network Enabled Capability’, p.3. 
17 ‘British Defence Doctrine’, 2008, pt.403e. 
18 ‘FLOC’, 2008, pt.120. 
19 ‘The Significance of Culture to the Military’, 2009, pt.5-1, Annex 5A. 
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In summary, British defence reform has been strongly informed by US transformation 
and the principles of jointness, NCW and EBO. NEC and EBAO are, however, more limited in 
ambition than their US counterparts. While the British military retains the capability to undertake 
MCO, it is more focused on the challenge of irregular conflict of rapidly-varying intensity. The 
‘human element’ is also central to NEC.20 Furthermore, NEC and EBAO shun the ‘long-
screwdriver’ approach to command and control in favour of the flexibility of Mission Command 
and are embedded within the principle of Manoeuvre Warfare and the Comprehensive 
Approach.21 Consequently, EBAO places a stronger emphasis on the role of non-kinetic effects 
than EBO.22 Rather than leading to a dramatic dissipation of EBAO, the decline of EBO in the 
US has, therefore, reinforced British observations EBO’s weaknesses. The concept of Effects-
Based Thinking prevails, that shuns the more ‘deterministic’ aspects of EBAO and reflects 
EBAO’s utility in targeting ‘closed systems’ such as infrastructure. The language of effects has 
also been retained to describe to ‘encourage users think about the effect they and their 
partners in a comprehensive approach to campaigning wish to achieve’.23   
 
A Stalling Defence Reform: Growing Stagnation in Capability Procurement and Force Postures 
 
There has been growing criticism of the ‘balanced forces’ approach that attempts to meet the 
challenges of ‘Stabilisation/COIN’ while retaining the capacity to conduct MCO and of the lack 
of definition on the precise implications of recent operational experiences for capabilities and 
force postures over the medium to long-term. There is an urgent need to rebalance capabilities 
to cope with ‘Stabilisation/COIN’ situations by increasing investment in strategic air-lift, 
medium- and heavy-lift transport helicopters and command, control, communications, 
computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities (C4ISR). The UK also 
faces overstretch in manpower-intensive COIN/Stabilisation, having significantly reduced 
infantry forces since 1990. Crucially, the 2003/04 DWPs were released before the requirement 
for a large-scale, long-term presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, which placed strain on the 
2003/04 DWPs’ planning assumptions (Cornish and Dorman, 2009a: 253).  
Some initial rebalancing in favour of Stabilisation/COIN has been initiated. On 15 
December 2009 Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth (2009-10) announced an expansion of the 
Chinook helicopter fleet from 48 to 70 by 2012/13, funded by the closure of RAF Cottesmore 
Harrier Base, cuts to the Tornado and Nimrod fleets and a reduction of 7,500 civilian staff (IND, 
2009). However, as former Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Richard Dannatt (2008) argues, the 
possible loss of relative power through the non-renewal of Trident, or through the reduced 
power projection capability that would derive from scrapping CVF, makes these projects 
imperative. It is, therefore, likely that the SDSR will adopt a ‘Seacorn’ approach to capabilities 
such as anti-submarine warfare and the fighter jet fleet, retaining a basic capability, but 
investing heavily in the updating of doctrine, training and the skill-base of industry.24  
Furthermore, the October 2009 Independent Review of Acquisition, conducted by 
Bernard Gray, highlights an ‘overheated’ capability acquisition process characterised by 
accelerating costs and timescales.25 The Report demonstrates that the key determinant of 
Britain’s capacity to adapt to the changing security environment will rest not in the allocation of 
extra resources, but the structuring of military input to defence planning. The document points 
                                                
20 ‘Network Enabled Capability’, 2005, p.9. See also ‘FLOC’, pts.157;159. 
21 ‘Campaigning’, 2008, pts.237-8; 410c. 
22 ‘Joint Air Operations: Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3-30,’JDCC, 2003, pt.506.  
23 EBO: Implications of Recent JFCOM Commander’s Guidance’, DG, DCDC, 24 September 2008’; Interviews, 
DCDC, Shrivenham, 18 November 2009; Interview, MoD, London, 20 November 2009. See also: ‘Chapter 3 
Influence: The Central Idea’ in ‘JDP 3-40, Security and Stabilisation’, pt.301-2. 
24 Interview, UKDA, Shrivenham, 18 November 2009. 
25 ‘Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence’, 15 October 2009, p.6. 
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to the need to urgently reform the capability acquisition process to allow civilian actors to exert 
greater control over the individual Services’ procurement plans.  
Since the 1998 SDR the institutional structures for capability acquisition have 
undergone several reforms, designed to ensure that projects reflect future possible conflict 
scenarios, whilst being responsive to contemporary operational requirements and to deliver 
projects on time and to budget. These reforms have, however, met with limited success in 
delivering capabilities on time, to budget, and in a prioritised manner. Gray’s Report finds an 
‘overheated’ procurement programme, concluding that the costs of programmes are on 
average 40% greater than planned and delivered 80% later than estimated.26 The Report notes 
the urgent requirement for a defence review to provide top-down guidance on the exact 
balance between MCO and ‘Stabilisation/COIN’ capabilities and demonstrates the negative 
impact of poor civilian control over acquisition that has led to overbidding and underestimations 
of cost. Problematic institutional structures are identified as the MoD Capability Sponsor 
(composed of Single-Service Officers) and the Defence Board (composed of Service Chiefs 
who are not subordinate to the Chief of Defence Staff and enjoy direct access to the Prime 
Minister). 27  These organs, dominated by military input, are incapable of making a sober 
assessment of priorities in procurement.28 As a source within Defence Equipment and Support 
noted: ‘The dominance of the Services in decision-making on procurement is highly-
problematic. It is questionable whether a military figure rooted in his/her Single-Service has the 
necessary neutrality to balance requirements with resources’.29  
Although there is a strong consensus about military ‘best practice’ over the short term, 
the nature of conflict scenarios over the medium-long term remains contested.30 Debates about 
future conflict scenarios are highly-politicised, exhibiting a mixture of ‘campaign tribalism’ and 
‘inter-service rivalry’ (Cornish and Dorman, 2009b: 737-39), particularly at the senior levels of 
the Services, whose leaders wish to maximise long-term budget share. An MoD source noted: 
‘There is great desire for a rational prioritisation of capability investment at lower-levels of the 
Services but at the level of one-star officer and above career development depends upon how 
one delivers in defence of one’s Service’.31  
Consequently, the Army emphasises the long-term need to prepare for 
COIN/Stabilisation and exhibits a high-level of ‘campaign tribalism’ in favour of current 
operations in Afghanistan (Cornish and Dorman, 2009b: 737-39). The Navy draws attention to 
the potential for MCO and need for Carrier Strike Groups (BBC, 2009a), while the Air Force 
(despite recognising the short-term requirement to focus on ground-support, tactical air 
transport and helicopters) advocates investment in strike, attack and offensive-support aircraft 
(Edmunds, 2010: 384-85).32 Such debates highlight the increasingly urgent requirement for the 
2010 SDSR to deliver explicit guidance on the medium to long-term balance to be struck 
between capabilities and force postures relevant for ‘Stabilisation/COIN’ and those capable of 
addressing other potential conflict scenarios.  
 
Competing Visions of Military Change: Neorealist and Cultural Approaches 
 
                                                
26 Ibid, p.16. 
27 Ibid, p.30-1; interview, MoD, London, 20 November 2009. 
28 Interview, DE&S, MoD, Bristol, 16 November 2009. 
29 Ibid. 
30 The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036’, DCDC, 2006 p. 68. See also: ‘FLOC’, 2008, 
pt.114, b. 
31 Interviews, MoD, London, 19-20 November 2009. 
32 Ibid. It is, however, important to note that contestation also exists within the Services about their function and 
structure (Edmunds, 2010: 385). 
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Cultural and Realist approaches dominate theoretical debate on the sources of military change. 
Cultural approaches emphasise the centrality of ‘path dependency’ and social construction in 
policy formation. Hence the literature on national ‘strategic culture’ posits that institutionally and 
societally-embedded norms ‘predispose societies in general and political elites…toward certain 
ideas and policies’ (Duffield, 1998: 27). This approach echoes the insights of sociological 
institutionalism: that institutions consist of ‘symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral 
templates that provide the “frames of meaning” guiding human action’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 
947). In their studies on German and French defence reform, Longhurst (2003) and Irondelle 
(2003) emphasise the role of ‘path dependency’. The concept of ‘path dependency’ is rooted in 
historical institutionalism’s assertion that institutions embody ‘formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions’ and tool-kits of action which provide actors with ways of 
defining problems and ‘logics of appropriate behaviour’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938).  
Farrell (2005: 450) argues that norms of ‘conventional warfare’ exist not only at the 
national, but at the global level, ‘which provide the basic template for military organisation’. 
These norms are embedded within transnational organisational fields and are disseminated 
through professional networks. Farrell (2005: 459-61) distinguishes between ‘well-established’ 
and ‘poorly-established’ norms (norms that are ‘poorly defined, new or not widely accepted’). 
When faced with transnational norms that resonate with dominant domestic norms, norm 
transplantation/grafting will proceed uncontested (Farrell, 2001: 81). However, when faced with 
external challenge, the more established a norm is, the more likely it is that it will be ‘bolstered’ 
(the allocation of greater resources to the practices dictated by the norm at risk in order to 
prevent its failure) rather than ‘stretched’ (expanding the boundaries of what is deemed 
acceptable) (Farrell 2005: 459-61).  
 Neorealism also provides a compelling explanation for military change. As in the 
market place, where the ‘invisible hand’ of market competition determines the behaviour of 
firms, so the ‘invisible hand’ of anarchy rewards those who conform to its logic with an increase 
in power and security, and punishes those who do not, with decline, defeat and even 
destruction (Waltz, 1979: 89-93). Hence the anarchic logic of the international system drives 
change at the domestic level, leading to the adoption of new military methods (Posen, 1984). 
The systemic distribution of capabilities and consequent new security challenges, coupled with 
the necessity of survival in an uncertain, ‘self-help’ world, leads to three possible outcomes 
(which can be combined to varying degrees).  
Firstly, the continuation of existing practices (policy inertia), whereby states fail to adapt 
to systemic imperatives and retain existing military objectives and instruments. Such stagnation 
will inevitably lead to a loss of power and influence. The second outcome is emulation, which 
constitutes the adoption of ‘best practice’: ‘The possibility that conflict will be conducted by 
force leads to competition in the arts and instruments of force…contending states imitate the 
military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity…competition 
produces a tendency towards sameness of the competitors…and so weapons of major 
contenders and even their strategies begin to look much the same’ (Waltz, 1979: 127). 
 However, whereas Waltz (1979: 127) prioritises the distribution of capabilities and the 
balance of power as the drivers of military emulation, Joao Resende-Santos, (2007) highlights 
how emulation should be understood as a rational response to the powerful effects of structural 
uncertainty and the logic of competition. States seek to minimise the costs and risks 
consequent upon their self-help efforts by emulating proven effectiveness in conflict, rather 
than simply emulating the state of greatest capability, as this forms the quickest and most 
effective strategy that involves least risk (Resende-Santos, 2007: 51, 58-61).  
The final outcome is innovation: ‘the discovery of new knowledge, invention of new 
practices or their recombination in new forms’ (Resende-Santos, 2007: 72). Innovation offers 
the promise of significant, though short-term, advantage over other states, due to the 
propensity of other great powers to mimic successful innovation. Innovation is, however, 
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inherently risky due to the potentially catastrophic implications of poor strategic choices. 
International structure therefore acts as a selection mechanism on the basis of ‘competitive 
effectiveness’: the extent to which a state’s defence policy will allow it to maximise its power 
and influence and ensure its survival, autonomy and prosperity (Resende-Santos, 2007: 63). 
The central criterion in determining the attractiveness of emulation is proven success in great 
power war (Resende-Santos, 2007: 81-2).  
 A state’s propensity to innovation/emulation is determined by the interplay between 
three factors. The first factor is the resource-technological basis of a state. The greater the 
capabilities of a state, the lower the risk that is associated with failed innovation/emulation 
(Resende-Santos, 2007: 73). The second factor is the intensity of competition: as the security 
environment becomes more threatening, the ‘safety margin’ of risk decreases and all but the 
most innovation-capable primary states prioritise emulation (Resende-Santos, 2007: 85-9). The 
final factor is the presence of alliance options, which can provide an incentive to bandwagon on 
the power and innovations of other states in the international system (Resende-Santos, 2007: 
88-92). 
Cultural approaches posit that what at first appears ‘radical’, ‘third-order’ change to the 
objectives and instruments of British armed forces in the 1997/98 SDR actually resonated with 
deeply-embedded norms within the British military. In short, there was a strong degree of ‘fit’ 
between transnational and domestic norms (Farrell, 2001: 81). Convergence with systemic 
imperatives did not, for example, challenge the Army’s embedded ‘logic of appropriateness’. 
The Army’s historical task in building and maintaining Empire developed a conception of the 
role of the army as fighting small wars outside Europe and a ‘distaste for inactivity’ (Thornton, 
2003: 42-6) and had retained its ‘colonial focus’ throughout the 1970s/80s, allowing smooth 
adaptation to the SDR’s expeditionary baseline (Thornton, 2003: 42-6).  
Farrell (2009: 787) points to the role of ‘realist’ factors in determining the selective 
emulation of the core concepts and capabilities that underpin the RMA in the 2002 and 2004 
White Papers: British resource constraints as a ‘secondary power’, the RMA’s complexity, as 
well as operational experience alongside the US in the 2003 Gulf War that demonstrated the 
importance of ‘old fashioned’ virtues of speed, surprise and superior warfighting. Nevertheless, 
Farrell also argues that cultural factors were prominent variables determining the precise 
trajectory of reform. Scepticism of technology and the British system of Mission Command are 
identified as core features of the military’s organisational culture and proved highly-resistant to 
the emerging transnational norms associated with EBO and NCW (Cassidy, 2004: 67-9; Farrell, 
2008: 788). However, as the following section will demonstrate, rather than rooted in the 
subjectivity of culture, one could also view features such as Mission Command, the 
Manoeuvrist Approach, and the focus of NEC and EBAO on ‘human factors’ and non-kinetic 
effects as having been bolstered by objective lessons derived from observation of the RMA in 
practice and from British operational experiences.  
 
The Process of British Defence Reform: International Structure and Executive Autonomy 
 
Operational Experiences and the Emergence of NEC, EBAO and the Comprehensive 
Approach 
 
As highlighted in the first section of the paper, it was not until the 2002 ‘New Chapter’ and 
2003/2004 DWPs that the implications of changes to the objectives of defence policy set out by 
the SDR were more clearly spelt out in terms of capability acquisition (Dorman, 2006: 152). 
This initial emphasis upon changes to policy objectives and military command structures in the 
SDR, followed by investment in procurement around NEC, reflects the insights of Neorealism. 
In the absence of an immediate threat to the territorial integrity of a state, policy makers in 
‘secondary’ states err on the side of caution, follow the strategy of least risk and cost and 
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commit themselves to significant defence procurement initiatives only when strategic 
imperatives and their associated ‘best practice’ in capability investment become clear and 
pressing (Dyson, 2008: 742, Hyde-Price, 2007: 32). The risks associated with an early 
emulation of the RMA were pertinently highlighted by Vice-Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham, 
Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Equipment Capability (1999-2002) in February 2000: ‘If we use 
technology ineptly, fail to integrate projects properly within an overall programme, pick the 
wrong technology, fail to spot the weakness which an opponent could exploit, or simply do 
nothing, we leave ourselves at a potentially staggering disadvantage’ (Blackham, 2000a: 34).    
As Resende-Santos (2007: 88-92) notes, the presence of Alliance options also play an 
important role determining a state’s propensity to military emulation or innovation. By the turn of 
the Century post-Cold War security challenges began to clarify and highlighted the continued 
importance of the US security guarantee to European security and the need for the European 
Great Powers to reinforce their utility as Alliance partners, underscoring the imperative of 
interoperability with US forces, necessitating emulation of the RMA. At the same time, the 1999 
Kosovo Conflict (Operation Allied Force) demonstrated the dangers associated with over-
reliance on the US security guarantee and the need to establish an independent European 
capacity for military action within its geopolitical neighbourhood. Hence the UK would also need 
to invest in the networked capabilities that would allow it to lead medium-sized European 
higher-intensity operations.33  
The Kosovo Conflict therefore played an important role in determining UK capability 
procurement. Operation Allied Force reinforced the changes instituted to defence policy 
objectives and command structures by the SDR and highlighted several networking and 
battlefield digitisation capabilities in need of acquisition to enhance jointness, to ensure the 
capacity to strike targets at speed and to allow the UK to remain a credible Alliance partner 
(Blackham, 2000a; 2000b; Dorman, 2006: 156).34 C2 (Command and Control) capabilities were 
identified as in critical need of investment, having been proved lacking in the transfer of real-
time information from ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) assets, which had 
also been identified as deficient. Furthermore, information operations and strategic airlift were 
distinguished as requiring urgent development.35 The initial stages of the Afghanistan conflict 
also underscored the imperative of emulating core features of the RMA to ensure that the 
interoperability gap, particularly in C2, did not widen (Day, 2002: 38-43).36  
At the same time, British conceptual development during the late 1990s, based upon 
the experiences of a growing number of crisis-management operations pointed to the need to 
invest in capabilities, training and doctrine enabling the military to achieve a wide-range of 
operational effects and coordinate its activities with other agencies and actors.37 During the 
early-mid 1990s British military doctrine made a sharp distinction between war, peacekeeping, 
peace-enforcement and COIN (Frantzen, 2005: 106). ‘Wider Peacekeeping’ (1994) 
emphasised impartiality and consent and failed to account for the lessons UNPROFOR (1992-
95) imparted about the need for a more active military role in peace-enforcement. The 
document was quickly replaced by ‘Joint Warfare Publication 3-50’ that envisioned a more 
‘robust’ role for Land Forces (Rollins, 2006: 88). The 1998 British Defence Doctrine formed an 
important watershed in thinking on expeditionary crisis-management operations (Cassidy, 
2004: 185-199; Frantzen, 2005: 108; Kiszely, 1998: 39). The document pointed to the 
‘continuum of conflict’ (the tendency of operations to vary quickly in intensity) and the difficulty 
                                                
33 See: ‘Future Capabilities, Factsheet 1: The Policy Baseline: Why We Need to Change’, MoD, 2004 and 
‘Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future’, 2003, pts.7.7–7.8. 
34 See Geoff Hoon, House of Commons Debate, 11 December 2003, Hansard vol. 415, p.1209, Chapter 6, ‘Key 
Defence Capability Issues and Joint Lessons’ in ‘Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis’, 2000. 
35 See ‘Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis’, Chapter 6. 
36 Interviews, DCDC Shrivenham, 18 November 2009; MoD, London, 20 November 2009. 
37 ‘The Comprehensive Approach’, 2006. 
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of making sharp distinctions between peacekeeping and high-intensity conflict (Frantzen, 2005: 
108).  
Hence, by the early-mid 2000s the imperative of constructing a balanced, flexible force 
capable not only of MCO, of undertaking ‘Stabilisation/COIN’, began to gain wider currency 
within the military.38 As Brigadier Melvin (2002: 42), Director of Land Warfare, argued in June 
2002: ‘British Land Forces should be prepared to conduct conventional warfighting, counter-
terrorism, and to win over the population simultaneously…Many of these are missions that 
human beings rather than technology are good at’. Consequently, even at the apex of US 
‘technological determinism’, British thinking on networking focused as much on the role of high-
technology assets in enhancing ‘Stabilisation/COIN’ as on MCO (Burridge, 2003: 23).39  
In short, the British experiences of full-spectrum operations during the 1990s had taken 
firm root by Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, although initial Effects-Based Thinking within 
the UK Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) dovetailed with US EBO (Farrell: 2008: 
791-2) it was more the ‘best practice’ demonstrated by operational experiences, than a 
culturally-embedded scepticism of technology that fostered resistance to a full-blown emulation 
of EBO.40 Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan also imparted the centrality of 
harmonising the collaboration of international organisations, the media, NGOs and Other 
Governmental Departments at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.41  EBAO has, 
therefore, developed with a stronger focus on the delivery of non-kinetic effects than EBO and 
has been firmly rooted within the Comprehensive Approach (Farrell, 2008: 795; Farrell and 
Gordon, 2009: 23-24).42 For these reasons the decline of EBO in the US has not involved a 
great conceptual leap, as British EBAO had already recognised many of EBO’s pitfalls. 
 Rather than rooted in the subjectivity of culture, the principles of Mission Command 
and the Manoeuvrist Approach have also been bolstered by the lessons of operational 
experiences. The origins of Mission Command lie in Prussian military thought and the concept 
forms a key element of the British Manoeuvrist Approach. As Danchev (1998: 33-35) and 
Kiszely (1998) demonstrate, the core features of the Manoeuvrist Approach can be traced back 
to Sun Tzu, but also to the British theorist JFC Fuller (1928), and the ‘indirect approach’ of Basil 
Liddell Hart (1929). It was not, however, until the mid-1970s that Manoeuvre Theory was 
revised (Kiszely, 1999: 37) and the principle of Manoeuvre Warfare and its associated concept 
of Mission Command was only formally adopted in place of Montgomery’s ‘Set-Piece Battle’ by 
the British military in 1987 (Kiszely, 1999). This relatively recent adoption of the Manoeuvrist 
Approach by the British casts some doubt on the depth of the concept’s cultural ‘roots’ (Melvin, 
2002: 39; Storr, 2003: 119-21).43  
The British ‘lessons-learned’ process on command and control has been influenced not 
so much by culture, as by observation of US operations, notably the 2003 Iraq Conflict, which 
raised concerns about the potential of hierarchical command and control to undermine tempo 
and surprise (McColl, 2004: 52-3). This lack of attention to ‘human factors’ in NCW and EBO 
was, of course, confirmed by FM 3-24 in December 2006. Observation of the RMA has been 
supplemented by British operations, before and after the SDR. Operations in Bosnia, 
demonstrated the applicability of the Manoeuvrist Approach to peacekeeping at the operational 
and tactical levels (Kiszely, 1998: 39). Kosovo, Sierra Leone (2000) and Operation Telic also 
                                                
38 Interviews, MoD, London, 19-20 November 2009. 
39 Interviews, DCDC Shrivenham, 18 November 2009; MoD, 19-20 November 2009. 
40 Interviews, DCDC, Shrivenham, 18 November 2009. 
41 ‘The Comprehensive Approach’, 2006, pt.102. 
42 Farrell (2009: 24) notes that ‘the UK military has made significant advances in terms of enhancing its capabilities 
and approaches to Counterinsurgency, and of working with civilian partners to stabilise and develop Helmand’. 
However it is important to note that the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan has also 
been associated with significant problems (Grey, 2009; King, 2010: 311-14). 
43 On contestation within the British military concerning Manoeuvrist Approach’s utility, see Owen (2008: 62-7). 
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illustrated the importance of the balance ‘between direction and delegation’ provided by 
Mission Command (Dorman, 2006: 156-57; Melvin, 2002: 40; Storr, 2003: 123). 44 
Consequently, NEC and EBAO have been firmly-embedded within the Manoeuvrist Approach 
and its associated concept of Mission Command. As Major General Bailey (2004: 50) notes: 
‘On the modern battlefield where friendly, enemy and neutral elements intermingle, where the 
terrain, often urban, is complex, and where intentions become increasingly difficult to decipher, 
it will be, more than ever, the commander on the ground who will have the best feel for the 
truth.’ The objective utility of the principles of Mission Command/Manoeuvre Warfare is further 
illustrated by the convergence of France and Germany around these principles during the post-
Cold War era and the recognition within the US military of the need to adopt the principles of 
Mission Command in Stabilisation/COIN (Dyson, 2010: 146-47).45 
 In summary, rather than the interaction between domestic norms and global norms of 
conventional warfare, the selective emulation of US EBO and NCW that emphasises the 
centrality of ‘human factors’, flexibility in command and control and the importance of a 
Comprehensive Approach is primarily a result of British operational experience and conformity 
to ‘best practice’. While a socialisation process is underway, it is not driven by transnational 
norms of conventional warfare, but by the powerful forces of uncertainty and competition. The 
imperative of determining the lessons of operational experiences and of assessing others’ 
experiences with the RMA as objectively as possible formed a powerful mechanism spurring 
dynamism at the operational level. The potentially disastrous consequences of drawing 
erroneous lessons from ongoing conflicts acts as a powerful incentive to the military to attempt 
to strip doctrinal and conceptual development from subjectivity. This dynamism is, however, not 
a fully automatic process. As the following section will demonstrate, the role of the civilian 
leadership in structuring military input into defence planning has also been important in 
ensuring adherence to the dictates of operational experience and ‘best practice’.  
 
Providing ‘Institutional Protection’ for Operational Adaptability  
 
The operational dynamism of the British military has been facilitated by the institutional 
protection provided by the JDCC and UK Defence Academy (UKDA) for the principles of 
jointness and interoperability with alliance partners and capacity of these institutions to foster 
an environment of experimentation and critical thought on doctrine and Concept Development 
and Experimentation (CD&E).46 The JDCC, established in the aftermath of the 1998 SDR, 
provided institutional protection for the ‘transformation’ process as networking gathered pace 
and the requirement for jointness became pressing (Cornish and Dorman, 2009a: 253; 
Frantzen, 2005: 107).47 The JDCC worked in partnership with the Single-Service Warfare 
Centres to enhance the objectivity of the ‘lessons-identified’ process by distancing doctrinal 
development and CD&E from the bureaucratic politics of inter-service competition. In 2006 the 
JDCC was strengthened, becoming the DCDC and the central military authority on doctrinal 
and conceptual work.  
Reforms have also been instigated to the UK ‘lessons-identified’ process following 
operations which have helped to develop a rigorous process of lesson-identification and follow-
up on doctrine, training and capabilities at the operational level, particularly on jointness and 
interoperability.48 While doctrinal development during the Cold War was relatively static, the 
1982 Falklands Campaign initiated the process of institutionalising lesson-identification within 
                                                
44 Interviews, DCDC Shrivenham, 18 November 2009. On Mission Command and Operation Telic, see ‘Chapter 
Three’, ‘Operations in Iraq…’, 2003. 
45 FM 3-24, pts.1-145-1.146. 
46 Interviews, DCDC Shrivenham, 18 November, 2009; Interviews UK MoD, 19-20 November 2009. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
 12 
the Single-Service Warfare Directorates. 49  It was not, however, until 1996 that lesson-
identification received coordination through the establishment of the Permanent Joint 
Headquarters (PJHQ). The J7 Division of PJHQ, responsible for Joint Training has worked with 
the DCDC and Single-Service Warfare Centres to collate operational experiences and enhance 
joint warfare development.50 The PJHQ acts a ‘service agnostic node’ in lesson-identification 
and follow-up, determining which service will take the lead on implementing joint lessons.51 The 
DCDC, in partnership with the Single-Service Warfare Centres, heads up the interviewing of 
several levels of command following operations and distills and disseminates key joint 
lessons.52 The DCDC enjoys a good working relationship with the Warfare Centres which have, 
overall, been cooperative in developing a strong culture of jointness.53 The DCDC is also active 
in identifying and communicating lessons-learned with Allies through NATO and enjoys close 
bi-lateral relationships with JFCOM and US Single-Services.54 The lessons of operational 
experience quickly find their way into pre-deployment training, as Officers and Commanders 
who have had recent experience of deployment are closely involved in the development and 
delivery of training.55 
Despite the PJHQ and DCDC lead role and implementation of an IT system in support 
of the lessons-identified process, the system of lesson-identification has received criticism for 
its follow-up. The Single-Services retain authority in identifying and following-up the lessons of 
operations which are not perceived by PJHQ/DCDC as having implications for jointness. 
Although the lessons-identified processes of the Services are viewed by the DCDC and other 
actors within the MoD as competent, the Services retain the capacity to erect a ‘firewall’ 
hindering the ability to determine the extent of follow-up.56 Hence there is a requirement for 
more neutral, centralised management of follow-up for Single-Services issues.  
Furthermore, in 1995 the Directorate of Operational Capability (DOC) was established 
under former Defence Secretary Michael Portillo (1995-7). DOC conducts audits of the 
operational capabilities set by the Defence Programme Directory (an internal MoD document 
matching Defence Planning Assumptions to Force Structures and Capabilities) and gathers 
and exposes operational lessons. DOC reports directly to the Ministerial level, and is meant to 
act an extra filter to sift-out organisational politics.57 The Vice-Chief of Defence Staff takes 
responsibility for ensuring that problems identified are followed-up and implemented and must 
answer to the Defence Secretary. DOC’s capacity to translate operational lessons into changes 
to force posture/capabilities is, however, constrained by the direction to force postures 
delivered within the 2003/04 DWPs, which the Services can invoke to justify the status quo.58 
The UK has also implemented the Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) scheme 
coordinated by PJHQ and the MoD. Since the inception of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
the scheme has involved an outlay of £3.6 billion (MoD, 2009).59 Financed by contingency 
funding from the Treasury, UORs must be fielded with 18 months of a request’s ratification. The 
scheme is self-policing by the MoD and PJHQ with broad oversight from the Treasury; a 
system that functions well, as should the MoD UORs to request non-urgent equipment, it would 
threaten a valuable stream of revenue.60 It has, however, been more difficult to push through 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
50 Interview, MoD, London, 19 November 2009. 
51 Interviews, MoD, London, 19-20 November 2009. 
52 Interviews, DCDC, Shrivenham, 18 November 2009. 
53 Interviews, DCDC, Shrivenham, 18 November 2009; MoD, London, 19-20 November 2009. 
54 Interviews, DCDC, Shrivenham, 18 November, 2009. 
55 Interviews, DCDC, Shrivenham, 18 November 2009; Interview MoD, 19 November 2009. 
56 Interviews, DCDC, Shrivenham, 18 November 2009; MoD 19-20 November 2009. 
57 Interviews, MoD, London, 19-20 November 2009. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Interview, MoD, London, 20 November 2009. 
60 Interviews, MoD, London, 19-20 November 2009. 
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changes to the formal equipment programme following the identification of UORs with medium-
long term implications (for reasons explored below).61   
In summary, despite some problems, the set of institutional reforms undertaken since 
the mid-late 1990s has been largely successful in promoting jointness and interoperability and 
in the identification of and conformity to ‘best practice’ at the operational level.  
 
Neoclassical Realism and the Temporal Management of Reform at the Strategic Level 
 
As outlined earlier in the paper, the ‘bottom-up’ dissemination of post-Cold War lessons-
learned into far-reaching changes to force postures and capability investment has been 
hampered by the impact of organisational politics at the higher-levels of the Services.62 Yet, as 
this section will demonstrate, it is not organisational politics that is the key variable in 
determining ‘strategic drift’. Causality lies in the electoral cycle that has incentivised the 
temporal management of defence reform by the core executive since the mid-2000s. This has 
hindered dynamism in the strategic direction of British defence policy and defence capability 
procurement during the final term of the Labour Government (2005-10) and has reduced the 
ability of the core executive to make crucially-needed changes to the procurement process.  
Hence, while Neorealism provides a compelling framework to conceptualise the 
selective emulation of the RMA and dynamism at the operational level, it emerges as a more 
limited tool in understanding the precise timing of reform, particularly at the strategic level. 
Neorealism posits that executive decision-makers enjoy a high-level of autonomy in translating 
threats from the international security environment into changes to military doctrine and 
structures and in overcoming domestic opposition and organisational politics. The theory 
argues that the ability of policy-makers to drive change is particularly strong as the level of 
external threat increases and models of military best practice become clear, due to the 
potentially catastrophic implications of the loss of relative power that can result from faulty 
strategic choices (Posen, 1984). Neorealism is, therefore, unable to fully explain the process of 
British defence reform, as despite increasing pressure from the international security 
environment (notably the clear need to reprioritise capabilities and force structures for ongoing 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2006), reform has been subject to temporal 
management during the last Parliament  (Cornish and Dorman, 2010: 409). 
Cornish and Dorman (2009a; 2009b; 2010) highlight the myriad of problems facing 
British policy following the deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq and note the difficult choices 
decision-makers will encounter in the forthcoming SDSR in the context of economic crisis. 
However, they deliver no overarching explanation of the process and outcome of UK defence 
reform; of the pattern of operational dynamism and strategic inertia identified in this paper. 
Neoclassical Realism provides a compelling theoretical framework with which to conceptualise 
these phenomena. In accordance with the core premises of Neorealism, the theory posits that 
states seek will, over the long-run, seek to maximise international influence according to their 
relative material power. Yet the theory also shares Classical Realism’s concern with the impact 
of domestic-level variables. It argues that ‘state power’ (the impact of the strength of a country’s 
state apparatus and its relations to the surrounding society upon ability of the state to mobilise 
and extract resources from society) is highly-varied and forms the central intervening unit-level 
variable explaining short to medium-term temporal divergence with the dictates of international 
structure (Lobell et al 2009: 25).  
There is a substantial and growing literature on Neoclassical Realism that is 
characterised by contestation over the unit-level variables which should be accorded priority in 
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determining ‘state power’. Neoclassical Realist scholars such as Schweller (2004: 169); Snyder 
(1991); Taliaferro (2006); Van Evera (1999) and Zakaria (1998: 38) integrate a wide array of 
variables which impact upon ‘state power’, including ideology and culture. This section 
highlights the central intervening role played by domestic material power relations in 
determining the timing of British convergence with the dictates of ‘best practice’. It argues that 
the level of autonomy afforded to the political executive by the electoral cycle (executive 
autonomy) forms the key variable in explaining the inability of the Labour Government to 
effectively structure military input to defence planning on issues of defence capabilities and 
force postures. 
In accordance with Neorealism, it is important to note the impact of the lack of clarity 
about ‘best practice’ in capability investment on the inability of civilian leaders to provide 
compelling top-down guidance on procurement until the early 21st Century. This factor must 
also be taken into account when explaining the disjuncture between financial planning and 
defence acquisition following the 1997/98 SDR (Cornish and Dorman, 2010: 405) and in 
understanding why the SDR was ‘less forward-thinking in its assessment of the technology-
based RMA’ (Cornish and Dorman, 2009a: 252). In 1997/98 a significant degree of uncertainty 
persisted about the implications of the RMA and unipolarity, making it difficult to forsee the 
consequences for capability procurement and the defence budget. 
 Nevertheless, the root cause of the current strategic drift in UK defence policy lies not 
in the gradual process of ‘strategic learning’, but in the constraints of decreased executive 
autonomy. It is broadly recognised within the MoD that an SDR was required in 2006/07 as the 
imperative of striking a more appropriate balance between requirements in Afghanistan/Iraq 
and potential future conflict scenarios became apparent, and the concepts and necessary 
C4ISR capabilities associated with the UK’s selective emulation of the RMA had clarified.63 
However, the core executive’s ability to undertake far-reaching reforms to ameliorate the effect 
of campaign tribalism and organisational politics between the Single-Services on capability 
procurement and force postures grew increasingly limited from 2007. At this point, the 
Government, with declining popularity and a General Election on the horizon, became acutely 
sensitive to the potential for ‘bad news’ in terms of jobs lost within the UK defence industry (that 
supplies 10% of UK manufacturing jobs and is 75% dependent on MoD expenditure) (BBC, 
2009b).64 Labour was also highly-sensitive to the potential electoral fall-out of widespread base 
closures which would follow significant changes in force postures.65   
The impact of the electoral cycle dissuaded the core executive from conducting a 
defence review in 2006/07, precisely when it became apparent that rebalancing of capability 
investment and force posture to cope with the challenges of COIN and large-scale, sustained 
campaigning in two theaters of operation was required.66 A review could only have been 
launched immediately following Labour’s election victory in 2005. The implementation of a 
review completed later than the first 12-18 months of the new Parliament would have had a 
negative impact on Labour’s performance at the following election. Consequently, Ainsworth 
only officially recognised the need for a new defence review in July 2009 and the Cabinet 
Office instructed Ainsworth to ‘keep defence as quiet as possible before the general election’ in 
recognition of difficulties associated with implementing a defence review (Cornish and Dorman, 
2010: 401).67 An earlier review that developed broad cross-party consensus on the strategic 
direction of British defence policy and the implications for capabilties and force structures would 
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66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
 15 
have had the effect of ameliorating both inter-Service rivalry and ‘campaign tribalism’ by 
compelling the Single-Services to undertake far-reaching reform.  
UK defence policy has, therefore, been subject to an excessively long phase of ‘policy 
failure/inertia’ (Cornish and Dorman, 2010: 400-03). This situation contrasts markedly with the 
high executive autonomy enjoyed by Labour following the 1997 General Election, in the form of 
its large Parliamentary majority, facilitating the implementation of the far-reaching changes of 
the 1997/98 SDR. The extended stage of policy inertia in the UK also mirrors the more 
persistent problems encountered by the German core executive in implementing defence 
reform due to frequent Laender elections (Dyson, 2008: 749-58). As a senior source noted: 
‘The current drift in UK defence policy is a consequence of the electoral cycle: no government 
would be in a position to implement a resource-driven SDR process at any point other than the 
first two years of a new Parliament’.68 However, this narrow executive autonomy may persist in 
the new Parliament, as the internal politics of the new Conservative-Liberal coalition 
government could well impact on the core executive’s willingness to push through unpopular 
base closures and major changes to defence acquisition. 
 
The Way Forward: Preparing Institutional Protection for the SDSR 
 
The January 2010 Green Paper outlined the Labour Government’s intention to conduct a 
defence review every four/five years and provide regular ‘top-down’ guidance on the strategic 
direction of reform. This proposal also found support amongst the Conservatives. Cornish and 
Dorman (2010: 404-06) are, however, highly-critical of the process of ‘policy formulation’ 
associated with previous defence reviews and identify the March 2008 National Security 
Strategy as a more appropriate model of ‘grand, strategic cross-governmental guidance’ 
(Cornish and Dorman, 2009b: 741). Yet the 1997/98 SDR was not without its merits.  
The 1997/98 SDR, as McInnes (1998: 830) notes, involved close coordination between 
the MoD and Foreign Office and a ‘clear attempt to devise a process whereby foreign policy 
principles would lead to military missions and force postures’. The SDR was, therefore, able to 
build strong cross-party consensus on defence that aligned defence with foreign policy and 
reduced the Treasury’s impact on the SDR’s outcome (McInnes, 1998: 844).69 As Cornish and 
Dorman (2010: 409) highlight, the forthcoming SDSR must also be driven by the ‘clearest 
sense of foreign policy goals’ and avoid being determined solely by ‘affordability’. The final 
process of determining ‘troops to task’ in the 1997/98 SDR was, however, more dependent on 
internal MoD advice (McInnes, 1998: 833). In their examination of defence planning throughout 
history Imlay and Toft (2006: 250) note that ‘effective war planning requires as many inputs as 
possible’. However, this process should not exclude the military. Having consulted widely on 
the broad strategic direction of the 1997/98 SDR and imbued the key changes in task with 
gravitas, it made sense to allow military planners greater room to determine the more specialist 
issues of ‘troops-to-task’. In summary, while attaining broad direction from a revised National 
Security Strategy is a sensible approach, the SDSR would do well to achieve the 1997/98 
SDR’s balance between military and civilian input, particularly on the strategic vision 
underpinning UK defence policy.  
 Furthermore, reforms are planned to strengthen the capacity of the MoD’s Directorate 
General (DG) Strategy to deliver the goals identified by the SDSR and avoid ‘policy 
misimplementation’ (Cornish and Dorman, 2010: 407-08). DG Strategy is responsible for 
strategic assessment and fleshing-out force posture baselines and works closely with the 
Defence Intelligence Staff to develop the Strategic Assessment; a classified document that 
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involved a greater reliance on internal expertise and significant input from the MoD’s Policy Planning Directorate 
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outlines key areas of insecurity over a 15-20 year period.70 The DCDC has also become an 
increasingly important actor providing input to the future conflict scenarios developed by DG 
Strategy, to the point that the DCDC is referred to within the MoD as the ‘Ministry’s Fourth 
Floor’.71   
The DG Strategy is particularly ‘civil servant-heavy’ in order to attempt to insulate 
Strategy from Single-Service agendas.72 However, the DG’s capacity to overcome the ‘status 
quo’ on delivering policy into programme has been hampered by yearly planning rounds which 
provide ‘post-facto justifications for existing force structures’ and by the Defence Board’s ability 
to block major change, leaving DG Strategy constantly playing ‘catch-up’.73 Consequently the 
yearly planning rounds will be replaced a new process of policy implementation following the 
SDSR.74 Defence Strategic Direction (DSD) will supercede Defence Strategic Guidance and 
form a more concise, longer-term (15-20 year) resource-informed vision of defence priorities. 
The DSD will be accompanied by a Defence Plan outlining how the DSD will be realised over 
the near-term (5 years), divided into a set of 10 sub-strategies for delivery.75 
 Finally, Gray’s Report, although highly-embarrassing for Labour, has imbued potential 
acquisition reforms impetus, which, if enacted will facilitate the implementation of a resource-
led SDR that matches financial constraints and strategy.76 The key recommendations of the 
Review were broadly accepted by Ainsworth.77 Gray’s proposals also found support within the 
Defence Acquisition Reform Project Team (AOF, 2009) and a number of these proposals have 
been taken up in the February 2010 Defence Strategy for Acquisition Reform.78  
 
Conclusions: The Implications for Future Research 
 
Defence policy during the Labour Government has been caught between the push and shove 
of ‘international structure’ and the constraints of narrowing executive autonomy. These findings 
challenge the insights of cultural approaches to the sources of military change: the literatures 
on transnational norms, path dependency, organisational and strategic culture. The paper also 
contributes to the growing literature on Neoclassical Realism. The focus on executive 
autonomy and domestic material power relations adds greater parsimony to a theoretical 
approach that is characterised by contestation over the domestic-level variables which impact 
upon ‘state power’ (Lobell et al, 2009: 297-98). Nevertheless, empirical research on the precise 
extent to which other variables, such as ideology and nationalism, emerge as constraints or 
tools for policy leaders in the generation of military power would add greater nuance to a 
Neoclassical Realist analysis of British defence policy. 
 Furthermore, the study draws attention to the need for a closer focus on civil-military 
relations in defence planning and on the precise balance between the ‘top down’ (civilian-led) 
and ‘bottom-up’ (military-led) dynamics of defence reform. The competitive nature of the 
international system provides strong incentives to draw the correct conclusions from military 
operations and observations of others’ experiences. However, there is also room for individual 
policy leadership in designing effective institutional protection for operational dynamism and for 
broader strategic-level defence planning (Rynning, 2001/02: 91-2). Further empirical and 
theoretical research is required on the role of policy leadership traits and skills both within the 
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civil service and the core executive, as part of a broader examination of the management of 
internal structures of delegation and oversight within the Defence Ministry (Dyson, 2007; 
Stulberg, 2007: 35).  Such ‘organisational capablities’79  are an important attribute in the 
effective generation of military power and the maximisation of international power and 
influence. While Cornish and Dorman (2009a; 2009b and 2010) touch upon the issue of deficits 
in UK strategic-level defence planning, the literature on post-Cold War defence reform, not only 
on Britain, but also on the other European Great Powers is remarkably quiet on this timely 
subject. Given the tight economic constraints to which defence budgets will be subject over 
coming years, it will be more crucial than ever that civilian decision-makers are able to filter out 
the negative impact of inter-service rivalry and campaign tribalism and ensure the effective 
integration of actors from civil-society in determining doctrine, CD&E, questions of force 
postures and capability investment. Further comparative work in this area is urgently required. 
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